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Abstract It usually happens that the alternatives to be voted on in com-
mittees are chosen or sponsored by some particularly active committee mem-
bers. For example, in parliaments, some representatives and some govern-
ment members are known to be especially active in introducing bills on
which the whole committee will later vote. It appears that parliamentary
agendas - namely amendment and successive elimination voting rules - are
vulnerable to strategic behavior by groups of individuals introducing mo-
tions which are not their most preferred alternatives. Our aim in this paper
is to evaluate how frequently this type of behavior is susceptible to arise.
Key words Parliamentary agendas - Sponsoring - Strategic behavior -
Impartial anonymous culture.
JEL Classication D71.
1 Introduction
Most of the literature on strategic voting studies the manipulation of in-
dividual preferences given the issue, that is the set of feasible alternatives.
The main result on this topic is the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gib-
bard 1973 and Satterthwaite 1975). It states that every nondictatorial voting
procedure selecting a unique outcome is vulnerable to strategic manipula-
tion of preferences, in the sense that one can nd some conguration of
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preferences at which some individual has an incentive to misrepresent her
preferences.
Besides, some authors are concerned with a related but di¤erent line of
investigation, which takes account of a variable issue; in other words the
set of alternatives open to the vote is not given a priori. This line must be
distinguished from the literature on the strategic e¤ects of agenda manipu-
lation, which takes into consideration the strategic ordering of alternatives
(see Banks 1985; Miller 1995).
One aspect of the variable issue analysis is strategic candidacy. More pre-
cisely, in an electoral context, strategic candidacy concerns the opportunity
for a potential candidate who cannot win the election given the preferences
of the voters, to opt in or to opt out, in order to secure another candidate
she ranks higher in her preferences than the one who would win the election.
Recently, Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997)
independently develop, in the context of representative democracy, the same
basic model of electoral competition in which the political process is modeled
as a three-stage game; they further assume that running as a candidate in
the election is costly. In stage 1, each citizen decides whether or not to
become a candidate; in the second stage, all citizens vote over the set of
declared candidates; and in stage 3, the winner can implement her favorite
policy and receive benet from her position. Their main result states that
there exist situations in which candidates, with no chance of winning, enter
the election in order to a¤ect the identity of the winner, even though such
entry is both optional and costly.
In this same context, another important work is due to Dutta, Jackson
and Le Breton (2000, 2001); they particularly focus on the incentive of can-
didates to strategically a¤ect the outcome of a voting procedure. They give
specic results for voting procedures based on sequential pairwise elimina-
tion of alternatives, but they also provide more general results. They show
that the outcome of every nondictatorial voting rule satisfying a unanimity
condition is susceptible to be a¤ected by strategic candidacy, not only when
the set of voters and candidates are distinct, but also when they overlap.
Another aspect of the variable issue approach, early introduced by Ma-
jumdar (1956), and later extensively discussed by Dutta and Pattanaik
(1978), is the problem of strategic sponsoring of alternatives. In a famous
example (see Section 2), Majumdar considers seven voters (the choosers)
two of whom are sponsors (two political opponents or two especially ener-
getic members of a committee who usually move all resolutions), and he
assumes that all voters always vote according to their sincere preferences.
This process of sponsoring takes place in two steps. First, sponsors choose
the issue, and second the alternatives in the chosen issue are then submit-
ted to the vote. The example shows that under simple majority rule, it
can be advantageous for sponsors to select alternatives non sincerely, i.e.
alternatives that do not come highest in their preference orderings.
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Dutta and Pattanaik (1978) provide a generalization of the result of
Majumdar. They prove that under a large class of voting procedures some
voting situations will give individuals opportunities of strategic sponsoring.
One can easily imagine actual situations where the process of sponsoring
takes place. The intuition behind the mechanisms we describe mainly refer
to parliamentary agendas: in parliaments, some representatives and some
government members introduce bills on which the whole committee will
later vote. But many other examples can be found in various elds. This is
the case for the pre-selection of candidates applying for a position in a rm
or some other organization (e.g. lecturers in universities); it usually happens
that a limited set of reporters chooses among candidates, and those who pass
this step then constitute the set of alternatives submitted to the vote of all
committee members. Another example can be found in the area of sports;
for the election of the "Ballon dor" of the journal "France Football", some
football - or soccer - players are rst selected by a limited set of French
journalists and then there is a nal vote by a larger international set of
journalists. A similar but more sophisticated process can be found for the
selection of the "NBA All-Star Games" players.
Also note that sponsoring of alternatives must be distinguished from the
rule of k names where given a set of alternatives a committee chooses k
members from this set by voting and make a list with their names, then a
single individual from outside the committee selects one of the list names
for the o¢ce (see Barbera and Coelho 2004).
In this paper, we examine strategic sponsoring under two families of par-
liamentary agendas widely studied in the literature (see Rasch 1995; Dutta,
Jackson and Le Breton 2001; Mbih, Moyouwou and Picot 2008 among oth-
ers). We now describe them.
Under these two rules, alternatives are ranked according to a prede-
termined order, say a1a2a3 in the three-alternative case. These rules are
commonly used in Parliaments for votes on ordinary motions.
On the one hand, the Anglo-American system is based on a "two by
two" procedure, namely the amendment procedure: the rst ballot is taken
between a1 and a2 in a pairwise majority contest, and the winner is taken
against a3;
On the other hand, the successive elimination rule is used in most coun-
tries of Western Europe. Alternatives are considered "one by one": the rst
vote is on alternatives a1; if a1 wins a majority, the procedure terminates;
if a1 is beaten, there is a second vote on a2, and so on, until there is a
winner or a unique alternative left. Note that this amounts to rst having
a majority contest between a1 and fa2; a3g, and then between a2 and a3 if
necessary.
Parliamentary voting procedures are vulnerable to strategic sponsoring
of alternatives (see Section 2). However, it remains to evaluate how fre-
quently this behavior is susceptible to occur. As pointed out by Pattanaik
(1978, p. 187)
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"This is important. For, if the likelihood of such strategic voting
is negligible, then one need not be unduly worried about the existence
of the possibility as such."
In this contribution, for each of the procedures described above, we are
interested in the quantitative signicance of the possibilities of strategic
sponsoring. Our evaluation relies on an analytical method, as opposed to
computer simulations. We compute the exact frequency of strategic spon-
soring opportunities under the impartial anonymous culture (IAC), a hy-
pothesis introduced in social choice theory by Kuga and Nagatani (1974)
and later developed by Gehrlein and Fishburn (1976). IAC is based on the
assumption that all anonymous proles (see Section 2) have the same proba-
bility of occurrence. In other words, our purpose is to compute the following
ratio:
number of anonymous proles vulnerable to coalitional strategic sponsoring
total number of all possible anonymous proles
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is a pre-
sentation of the general framework, with denitions, assumptions and some
examples; Section 3 gives a characterization of coalitional strategic spon-
soring situations; next, Section 4 provides our main results about strategic
sponsoring; and nally Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Notations and denitions
Consider a nite set N of n voters (choosers), with n  3, and a nite set
S of  sponsors, with   3. A will denote the set of alternatives, and 2A
the set of all possible nonempty subsets of A. Further, B will denote the
issue, that is the set of sponsored alternatives, B 2 2A.
The process of sponsoring, which leads to nal outcomes, takes place in
two distinct stages. First, sponsors choose, within the set A, the alternatives
that will be submitted to the vote at stage two. Each sponsor independently
chooses one alternative within this set, and one same alternative can be cho-
sen by more than one sponsor. The issue B is determined as the outcome of
the choice of alternatives by sponsors. At stage two the voters express their
individual preference orderings over B. And given a voting procedure and
the preference orderings expressed by individuals over the issue, the nal
outcome is determined.
Notice that in real life not all individuals may be potential sponsors (for
example, in parliaments, bills are only introduced by some active represen-
tatives or government members). We shall thus admit that   n. Moreover
we assume that the sets of voters and sponsors are disjoint, i.e. S\N = ?.
It was also possible to consider the case where S  N . This distinction can
be illustrated by the usual ways laws are introduced in Parliaments. For ex-
ample in France (and many other countries), bills are proposed by ministers
- who do not participate to the vote - while private bills are proposed by
representatives - who participate to the vote. In our study, in order to avoid
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unnecessary complexities, we only consider the case S \N = ?, since with
a xed number of sponsors and a large electorate, both cases lead to very
similar results.
Let L be the set of all possible linear orderings on A, that is the set of all
complete, antisymmetric and transitive binary relations on A. Ri denotes
voter i0s preference relation and Ri 2 L. A prole of voters preferences is
an n-tuple RN = (R1; R2; :::; Rn) of individual preference relations, one for
each individual voter, and LN is the set of all such proles. In the same way
for each sponsor j, let Rj be j0s preference relation; then RS is a prole of
sponsors preferences, and LS is the set of all such proles.
We now present the strategic sponsoring behavior more formally. We
rst need some general denitions.
Denition 1 A social choice function (SCF) is a mapping f from LN to
A.
Including a sponsoring process leads to a notion which is more general
than an SCF. For each prole RS of sponsors preferences over the set A of
alternatives, one issue B 2 2A is selected by the choice of a single alternative
by each sponsor. And for this issue, preferences of the voters determine the
nal outcome.
Denition 2 A social choice function with sponsoring (SCFS) is a mapping
g from 2A  LS  LN to A, such that for all  B;RS; RN 2 2A  LS  LN
g
 
B;RS; RN
 2 B:
Let B be the set of sponsored alternatives when sponsors choose sin-
cerely, that is when each of them chooses her most preferred alternative. B
is called a sincere issue.
Denition 3 Let S be the set of sponsors and B the sincere issue. Given an
SCFS g, a prole
 
RS; RN

is unstable via coalitional strategic sponsoring
if there exist some nonempty subset S0 of S and some other issue B0, such
that
(i) B \B0 6= ?;
(ii) g
 
B;RS; RN
 6= g  B0; RS; RN ;
(iii) and g
 
B0; RS; RN

Rjg
 
B;RS; RN

for all j 2 S0.
In words, strategic sponsoring occurs if there exists some group of spon-
sors S0 (possibly a single sponsor), who have an incentive to sponsor another
alternative in order to ensure that the new outcome is better from their
viewpoint.
Denition 4 A social choice function with sponsoring g is vulnerable to
coalitional strategic sponsoring if there exists at least one prole
 
B;RS; RN

unstable via coalitional strategic sponsoring.
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In the sequel, where there is no ambiguity we shall simply write unstable
via strategic sponsoring.
Note that a society choosing an alternative from a nite set using an
SCFS can be viewed as a game in normal form where (i) the set of players
is the whole set of agents, sponsors and voters, although we suppose here
that only sponsors can behave strategically; (ii) the set of strategies open
to agents is the set of all linear orders on A, and (iii) the payo¤ function
is the SCFS. With this interpretation of our context, an unstable situation
via coalitional strategic sponsoring appears as a prole that is not a strong
equilibrium point of the given game.
To illustrate the strategic sponsoring process, let us now present the
(famous) example of Majumdar (1956).
Example 1 Suppose there are two sponsors 1 and 2 among seven voters;
further there are four alternatives, a1; a2; a3 and a4, and the SCFS is the
plurality rule. Note that, in contrast to our study Majumdar assumes that
the sponsors participate to the vote. Individual preferences are as follows:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
a4 a3 a1 a3 a3 a2 a4
a1 a2 a2 a4 a1 a1 a2
a2 a1 a3 a2 a4 a3 a1
a3 a4 a4 a1 a2 a4 a3
If we suppose that the sponsors choose sincerely, then the sincere issue is
B = fa3; a4g. Then the voters express their individual preference orderings
over B, and a3 is chosen. But if sponsor 1 decides to sponsor a1 instead of
a4, then the new issue is B
0
= fa1; a3g, and a1 is chosen. And since sponsor
1 prefers a1 to a3, it appears that the prole above is unstable via strategic
sponsoring.
Up to now, all denitions and the example above have been given in
terms of proles, but only for convenience. In the remainder of this work,
we will be interested only in anonymous proles, in the sense that we do
not distinguish between two proles that di¤er only by the identity of the
individuals who express the same preference relation. In other words, the
outcome of a given conguration of individual preferences only depends on
the number of individuals with some type of preference relation, and not on
which individuals have that type of preferences. Thus, we assume anonymity
over the set of voters and over the set of sponsors.
From now on, we shall focus on the three-alternative case. Given a
set A = fa1; a2; a3g, there are exactly six linear orderings on A, labeled
below:
R1 : a1a2a3, R2 : a1a3a2, R3 : a2a1a3, R4 : a2a3a1, R5 : a3a1a2,
R6 : a3a2a1.
Then, a voting situation n is an anonymous voting prole obtained from
a prole RN by rewriting it as n = (n1; n2; n3; n4; n5; n6), where for each
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k = 1; :::; 6; nk is the number of voters in N with preference relation Rk. A
situation is thus a 6 tuple of natural integers such that 6k=1nk = n. The
set of all voting situations will be denoted N. Given a voting situation
n 2 N and two alternatives aj and ak, n(aj ; ak; n) is the number of voters
who prefer aj to ak given situation n.
Likewise, a sponsoring situation s = (s1; s2; s3; s4; s5; s6) is obtained
from a prole RS where sk is the number of individuals in S with preference
relation Rk and 
6
k=1sk = . The set of all sponsoring situations will be
denoted S. And (aj ; ak; s) is the number of sponsors who prefer aj to ak
given situation s.
Note that every prole
 
RS; RN

can be rewritten as a situation (s; n);
(s; n) is then said to be associated with
 
RS; RN

. The denition below
follows straightforwardly from Denitions 3 and 4.
Denition 5 A situation is unstable (via coalitional strategic sponsoring)
if it is associated with an unstable prole.
Denition 6 A social choice function with sponsoring g, is vulnerable to
coalitional strategic sponsoring if there exists some unstable situation under
g.
In our study we consider two families of parliamentary agendas, namely
the amendment and successive elimination procedures, with possibly qual-
ied majority. An -majority contest, rst introduced in the social choice
literature by Slutsky (1979), is a rule under which, given some  2 ]0; 1[
and a voting situation n, an alternative ah is socially preferred to (at least
as good as) ak if the number of individuals who prefer ah to ak is at least

1  times the number of individuals who prefer ak to ah. Moreover, ties
are broken in favor of the alternatives with the greatest index, which can
be written as follows:
ah beats ak ,

h < k ) n(ak; ah; n) < n(n)
k < h) n(ah; ak; n)  n(n)
Notice that simple majority corresponds to  = 12 . Also note that small
values of  give a signicant advantage to alternatives with greater indices.
Reciprocally, large values of  give an advantage to alternatives with smaller
indices.
Under the -amendment procedure (denoted AP) one assigns to a vot-
ing situation n the alternative AP(B; s; n) dened as follows:
(a) if B contains a single alternative x, then AP(B; s; n) = x;
(b) if B is a pair of two alternatives x and y, then AP(B; s; n) is the winner
of the -majority contest between x and y;
(c) if B = fa1; a2; a3g then AP(B; s; n) is selected from the -majority
contest between a3 and the winner of the -majority contest between
a1 and a2. Then, only one of the four scenarios below holds:
a1 beats a2 at the rst ballot and a1 beats a3 at the second ballot
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a1 beats a2 at the rst ballot and a3 beats a1 at the second ballot
a2 beats a1 at the rst ballot and a2 beats a3 at the second ballot
a2 beats a1 at the rst ballot and a3 beats a2 at the second ballot
Under the -successive elimination procedure (denoted SE), one as-
signs to a voting situation n the alternative SE(B; s; n) dened as follows:
(i) ifB contains at most two alternatives then SE(B; s; n) andAP(B; s; n)
coincide;
(ii) for B = fa1; a2; a3g, voters have to compare A1 = fa1g and A2 =
fa2; a3g at the rst ballot. If A1 is selected then SE(B; s; n) = a1,
otherwise SE(B; s; n) is the winner of the -majority contest between
a2 and a3 at the second ballot. Then, only one of the three scenarios
below holds:
a1 beats fa2; a3g at the rst ballot
fa2; a3g beats a1 at the rst ballot and a2 beats a3 at the second ballot
fa2; a3g beats a1 at the rst ballot and a3 beats a2 at the second ballot
Further, for the latter class of procedures, every individual must compare
A1 = fa1g with the set A2 = fa2; a3g. Thus additional information on
individual behavior has to be provided, explaining from Ri which subset,
out of A1 = fa1g and A2 = fa2; a3g, is most preferred by voter i. We then
assume that there are two types of voters in society N , with two distinct
attitudes, namely maximin behavior or maximax behavior.
Then, with the successive elimination rules, we shall consider two di¤er-
ent families of procedures:
(1) the voters are all supposed to have maximin behavior, then we denote
this type of successive elimination rules, SEm;
(2) and the voters are all supposed to have maximax behavior, then we
denote this type of successive elimination rules, SEM.
The reader can easily check that these two families of rules are vulnerable
to strategic sponsoring, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 2 Consider three sponsors who do not participate to the vote, ve
voters, and alternatives a1, a2 and a3. AP 1
2
is the voting rule. Assume
individual preferences are as follows:
Sponsors
Rk R1 R3 R4
a1 a2 a2
a3 a1 a3
a2 a3 a1
sk 1 1 1
Voters
Rk R1 R3 R5 R6
a1 a2 a3 a3
a2 a1 a1 a2
a3 a3 a2 a1
sk 1 1 2 1
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A sincere behavior by the sponsors leads to B = fa1;a2g andAP 1
2
( B; s; n)
= a1. However if sponsor with preference R3 chooses a3 rather than a2, then
the new issue is B0 = fa1;a2; a3g and AP 1
2
(B0; s; n) = a3. We observe that
a3 is preferred to a1 by that sponsor.
Our main purpose in this contribution to social choice theory is to com-
pare the three families of rules described above through their vulnerability
to strategic sponsoring, for any possible situation. In order to do that, we
compute the ratio
number of situations (s; n) unstable via coalitional strategic sponsoring
total number of all possible situations (s; n)
Note that such frequency evaluations are based on the hypothesis that
all possible situations (s; n) have the same probability of occurrence. Thus,
as said above, we assume anonymity over the set of voters and over the set
of sponsors.
In the next two sections, we characterize situations at which for each
voting system considered in this paper coalitional strategic sponsoring is
susceptible to occur. And these characterizations are then used to obtain
formulae giving frequencies measuring the vulnerability of those systems to
strategic sponsoring.
3 Characterizations of unstable situations
As explained in Denition 6, a social choice function with sponsoring g, is
vulnerable to coalitional strategic sponsoring if there exists some unstable
situation under g. This section characterizes the sets of all situations (s; n)
unstable via strategic sponsoring. More precisely, to illustrate the reasoning,
we focus on the particular case where a1 is the initial winner. For a general
characterization of vulnerable situation for amendment and successive elim-
ination procedures with maximin and maximax see the associated working
paper (Courtin, Mbih and Moyouwou 2008). Likewise, not all proofs are
given below, because they are very similar; we only provide details for the
proof concerning the amendment procedure. For all the other proofs, the
reader can refer to the associated working paper.
3.1 Preliminary observations on strategic sponsoring
Given a set of three distinct alternatives fah; aj ; akg, let us consider a social
choice function with sponsors. We assume that sponsors can choose only
one alternative. Depending on sponsors preferences, several sincere issues B
are conceivable. Moreover, according to a particular sincere issue, strategic
behavior by the sponsors can occur in several ways.
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First suppose that B consists of a unique alternative ah, that is all spon-
sors have ah as the same most preferred alternative. Then by the denition
of a social choice function with sponsors, ah is selected by the voters. Since
ah is trivially the best outcome for each sponsor, therefore there is clearly
no way for strategic sponsoring.
Now suppose that the sincere issue is B = fah; ajg and without loss of
generality, assume that ah is elected. Then there are three types of possible
collective strategic sponsoring: the new issue is fah; akg and ak is nally
elected (Type 1); the new issue is fah; aj ; akg and aj wins (Type 2); and
the new issue is fah; aj ; akg and ak wins (Type 3). Note that strategic
behavior in case Type 3 is undertaken in favor of alternative ak, which is
added to the sincere issue B, while in case Type 2, strategic sponsoring is
in favor of aj , which was already sponsored in B. Also observe that, for
strategic sponsoring to occur, the case where the new issue is fahg is not
possible since ah is already the winner. In the same way, from B = fah; ajg,
situations where the new issue is fajg or fakg or faj ; akg are not rational,
since this would require a change by ahs sponsors, which is not possible
since ah is their most preferred alternative.
Finally, suppose that B = fah; aj ; akg and that ah is elected. Then
there is a unique way for strategic sponsoring to occur, Type 4, that is the
new issue is fah; ajg and aj is elected (or fah; akg is the new issue and
ak wins). For the same reason as above, situations where the new issue is
fahg, fajg, fakg or faj ; akg are not feasible.
In the next subsection and for each social choice function with sponsoring
under study, strategic attitudes Type 1, Type 2, Type 3 and Type 4 will be
useful in the proofs of characterizations results.
3.2 Unstable situations via strategic sponsoring
The statement below describes how a situation (s; n) must be in order for
it to be subject to possible strategic sponsoring. For simplicity, we only
consider the case where a1 is elected.
Proposition 1 Suppose AP is the voting rule and a1 is elected given some
situation (s; n). Then (s; n) is unstable via coalitional strategic sponsoring
if and only if
(1.a) or (1.d)8>>>><
>>>>:
n1+n2+n5>n n (1.1)
n4+n5+n6n (1.2)
s1+s21 (1.3)
s41 (1.4)
s1+s2+s4= (1.5)
8>>>><
>>>>:
n1+n2+n3>n n (1.18)
n3+n4+n6n (1.19)
s1+s21 (1.20)
s61 (1.21)
s1+s2+s6= (1.22)
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or (1.b) or (1.e)8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
n1+n2+n5>n n (1.6)
n4+n5+n6n (1.7)
s1+s21 (1.8)
s3+s42 (1.9)
s41 (1.10)
s1+s2+s3+s4= (1.11)
8>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>:
n1+n2+n3>n n (1.23)
n3+n4+n6n (1.24)
n1+n3+n4>n n (1.25)
s1+s21 (1.26)
s5+s62 (1.27)
s61 (1.28)
s1+s2+s5+s6= (1.29)
or (1.c)8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
n1+n2+n3>n n (1.12)
n3+n4+n6n (1.13)
n2+n5+n6n (1.14)
s1+s21 (1.15)
s5+s62 (1.16)
s1+s2+s5+s6= (1.17)
Proof Necessity. Let (s; n) be an unstable situation and suppose that a1 is
elected. From the previous analysis, the sincere issue is fa1; a2g, fa1; a3g or
fa1; a2; a3g.
First suppose that the sincere issue B = fa1; a2g. Only strategic spon-
soring Type 1, Type 2 or Type 3 are conceivable.
Type 1: the new issue is fa1; a3g and strategic sponsoring initiated by
the sponsors of a2 is in favor of a3 (1.a). Therefore there is at least one
sponsor with preference a1a2a3 or a1a3a2 (1.3), at least one sponsor with
preference a2a3a1 (1.4) and no sponsor with preference a2a1a3 (s3 = 0 in
(1.5) (since such a sponsor has no incentive to favor a3). Also observe that
since B = fa1; a2g, no sponsor has preference a3a1a2 nor a3a2a1 (s5 = s6 =
0 in 1.5). Given the sincere issue B, a1 beats a2 (1.1) and given the new
issue fa1; a3g, a3 beats a1 (1.2).
Type 2: the new issue is fa1; a2; a3g and strategic sponsoring is initiated
by the sponsors of a2 in favor of a3 (1.b). Then there is at least one sponsor
with preference a1a2a3 or a1a3a2 (1.8), at least two sponsors for a2 (1.9) with
at least one sponsor with preference a2a3a1 (1.10). And since B = fa1; a2g,
no sponsor has preference a3a1a2 or a3a2a1 (s5 = s6 = 0 in 1.11). According
to the sincere issue B, a1 beats a2 (1.6) and given the new issue fa1; a2; a3g,
a1 beats a2 (1.6) and a3 beats a1 (1.7), (note that at the rst ballot a1 beats
necessarily a2).
Type 3: the new issue is fa1; a2; a3g and strategic sponsoring must be in
favor of a2. However a1 beats again a2 at the rst ballot. Therefore strategic
sponsoring Type 3 does not occur under the amendment procedure. Note
that this is a consequence of the predetermined order a1a2a3 of pairwise
majority contests.
Now assume that the sincere issue B = fa1; a3g. Only strategic sponsor-
ing Type 1, Type 2 or Type 3 are conceivable. For Type 1 (1.d) and type 2
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(1.e), the proof is similar to the one above (just replace a2 with a3 and a3
with a2).
Type 3: the new issue is fa1; a2; a3g and strategic sponsoring initiated
by the sponsors of a3 is in favor of a3 (1.c). Then there is at least one
sponsor with preference a1a2a3 or a1a3a2 (1.15), at least two sponsors for
a3 (1.16) and no sponsor with preference a2a1a3 nor a2a3a1 (s3 = s4 = 0
in (1.17). Given the sincere issue B, a1 beats a3 (1.12) and given the new
issue fa1; a2; a3g, a2 must beat a1 at the rst ballot (1.13); if not, a1 will
defeat a3 at the second ballot. And a3 beats a2 at the second ballot (1.14).
Finally, assume B = fa1; a2; a3g. Then only strategic sponsoring Type
4 is conceivable.
Type 4: the new issues must be fa1; a2g or fa1; a3g, but a1 beats both
a2 and a3. Therefore there is no strategic sponsoring Type 4 under the
amendment procedure.
Su¢ciency. It is straightforward that strategic sponsoring Type 1 occurs
under constraints (1.a) or (1.d); strategic sponsoring Type 2 occurs under
constraints (1.b) or (1.e); and strategic sponsoring Type 3 occurs under
constraints (1.c).
We then consider successive elimination with maximin behavior.
Proposition 2 Suppose SEm is the voting rule and a1 is elected given
some situation (s; n). Then (s; n) is unstable via coalitional strategic spon-
soring if and only if
(2.a) or (2.b)8>>>><
>>>>:
n1+n2+n5>n n
n4+n5+n6n
s1+s21
s41
s1+s2+s4=
8>>>><
>>>>:
n1+n2+n3>n n
n3+n4+n6n
s1+s21
s61
s1+s2+s6=
or (2.c) or (2.d)8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
n1+n2+n3+n5>n n
n3+n4+n6n
s1+s21
s3+s41
s61
s1+s2+s3+s4+s6=
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
n1+n2+n3+n5>n n
n4+n5+n6n
s1+s21
s5+s61
s41
s1+s2+s4+s5+s6=
And nally, successive elimination with maximax behavior.
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Proposition 3 Suppose SEM is the voting rule and a1 is elected given
some situation (s; n). Then (s; n) is unstable via coalitional strategic spon-
soring if and only if
(3.a) or (3.b) or (3.c)8>>>><
>>>>:
n1+n2+n5>n n
n4+n5+n6n
s1+s21
s41
s1+s2+s4=
8>>>><
>>>>:
n1+n2+n3>n n
n3+n4+n6n
s1+s21
s61
s1+s2+s6=
8>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>:
n1+n2+n5>n n
n3+n4+n5+n6n
n2+n5+n6n
s1+s21
s3+s42
s41
s1+s2+s3+s4=
or (3.d) or (3.e) or(3.f)8>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>:
n1+n2+n3>n n
n3+n4+n5+n6n
n1+n3+n4>n n
s1+s21
s5+s62
s61
s1+s2+s5+s6=
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
n1+n2+n5>n n
n3+n4+n5+n6n
n1+n3+n4>n n
s1+s21
s3+s42
s1+s2+s3+s4=
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
n1+n2+n3>n n
n3+n4+n5+n6n
n2+n5+n6n
s1+s21
s5+s62
s1+s2+s5+s6=
In the next section, these characterizations will be subsequently used to
compute the likelihood of strategic sponsoring opportunities.
4 Strategic sponsoring occurrence
In this section and for each of the rules under study, two series of results
are provided: (i) we rst give formulae stating, for  = 12 , the frequencies
of coalitional strategic sponsoring with respect to n and  and (ii) we then
give general formulae stating those frequencies as a function of , n and .
We also consider special cases, specically when the electorate is innitely
large or when the number of sponsors is arbitrarily xed. All these results
are derived from the characterizations of unstable situations by the use of
computerised evaluations processes based on the same technique as the one
in Gehrlein and Fishburn (1976), Gehrlein and Lepelley (1999) or Huang
and Chua (2000).
Let us recall that the total number of situations (s; n) with three alter-
natives is
 
+5
5
 
n+5
5

= (+1)(+2)(+3)(+4)(+5)(n+1)(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5)14 400
4.1 Amendment rules
LetH(; n; ) be the likelihood that under amendment rules with -majority
contests, a strategic sponsoring situation exists with n voters and  spon-
sors. We shall rst consider the case  = 12 . We obtain the following results:
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Proposition 4 Let AP 1
2
be the voting rule. Suppose  is a xed proportion
k of n, that is  = n
k
. Then for n  2, H( 12 ; n; nk ) =8>>><
>>>:
5kn( 24k
4
n 144k4 290k3n2 1740k3n 1280k3+215k2n3+
1290k2n2+960k2n+74kn4+444kn3+320kn2+n5+6n4 )
16(2k+n)(3k+n)(4k+n)(5k+n)(n+1)(n+5)(k+n) if n  0 mod 2
5k( 24k
4
n
2
 144k4n+168k4 290k3n3 1740k3n2 1810k3n+215k2n4+
1290k2n3+1375k2n2+74kn5+444kn4+442kn3+n6+6n5 7n4 )
16(2k+n)(3k+n)(4k+n)(5k+n)(n+2)(n+4)(k+n) if n  1 mod 2
For some special values of k, we have:
Corollary 1 Suppose AP 1
2
is the voting rule. Then for n  2
H( 12 ; n;
n
5 ) =8>><
>>:
25n(n5+376n4+7595n3 2400n2 208 500n 250 000)
16(n+1)(n+5)2(n+10)(n+15)(n+20)(n+25)
25(n6+376n5+7588n4 1790n3 198 125n2 316 250n+105 000)
16(n+2)(n+4)(n+5)(n+10)(n+15)(n+20)(n+25)
if n  0 mod 2
if n  1 mod 2
H( 12 ; n;
n
4 ) =8>><
>>:
5n(n5+302n4+5216n3+3360n2 102 144n 118 784)
4(n+1)(n+4)(n+5)(n+8)(n+12)(n+16)(n+20)
5(n6+302n5+5209n4+3848n3 95 504n2 152 704n+43 008)
4(n+2)(n+4)2(n+8)(n+12)(n+16)(n+20)
if n  0 mod 2
if n  1 mod 2
H( 12 ; n;
n
3 ) =8>><
>>:
15n(n5+228n4+3267n3+4740n2 40 284n 46 224)
16(n+1)(n+3)(n+5)(n+6)(n+9)(n+12)(n+15)
15(n6+228n5+3260n4+5106n3 36 549n2 60 534n+13 608)
16(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+6)(n+9)(n+12)(n+15)
if n  0 mod 2
if n  1 mod 2
H( 12 ; n;
n
2 ) =8>><
>>:
5n(n5+154n4+1748n3+3480n2 10 464n 12 544)
8(n+1)(n+2)(n+4)(n+5)(n+6)(n+8)(n+10)
5(n6+154n5+1741n4+3724n3 8804n2 16 784n+2688)
8(n+2)2(n+4)2(n+6)(n+8)(n+10)
if n  0 mod 2
if n  1 mod 2
H( 12 ; n; n) =8>><
>>:
5n(n5+80n4+659n3+1320n2 804n 1424)
16(n+1)2(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5)2
5(n 1)(n5+81n4+733n3+2175n2+1786n 168)
16(n+1)(n+2)2(n+3)(n+4)2(n+5)
if n  0 mod 2
if n  1 mod 2
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These results can also be stated graphically in Figure 1:
Fig.1 Strategic sponsoring under amendment with
n
k
sponsors
Note that with any xed proportion n
k
of sponsors, frequencies tend to
0 as the number of voters rises. Also notice that given a xed number of
voters, the smaller the number of sponsors as compared with the number
of voters, the higher the frequencies of coalitional strategic sponsoring. For
example for n = 577, the size of the french parliament, the frequencies are
0:004 for k = 5 and 0:001 for k = 2. That is for n = 577, when the number
of sponsors is ve times less than the number of voters, strategic sponsoring
occurs almost three times more than when the number of sponsors is half
the number of voters. Table 1 in Appendix summarizes the results above.
Let us now present the more general formulae corresponding to  = 12 .
Proposition 5 Suppose AP 1
2
is the voting rule. Then for n  2 and   3,
H( 12 ; n; ) =8>>><
>>>:
5( n
2

4+74n23+215n22 290n2 24n2+6n4+
444n3+1290n2 1740n 144n+3203+9602 1280)
16(+1)(+2)(+3)(+4)(+5)(n+1)(n+5) if n  0 mod 2
5(n
2

4+74n23+215n22 290n2 24n2+6n4+444n3+
1290n2 1740n 144n 74+4423+13752 1810+168)
16(+1)(+2)(+3)(+4)(+5)(n+2)(n+4) if n  1 mod 2
Corollary 2 In a large society,
H( 12 ;1; ) =
5(4+743+2152 290 24)
16(+1)(+2)(+3)(+4)(+5)
For some special values of , we have:
 (sponsors) 3 4 5 6
H( 12 ;1; ) 0:145 0:150 0:142 0:131
These di¤erent limits show that the occurrence of strategic sponsoring,
with large value of n, is maximal for 4 sponsors and then decreases as 
rises. Also note that H( 12 ; n; ) tends to 0 when  tends to innity.
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From the characterizations of unstable situations above, we also derive
general formulae stating those frequencies as a function of , n and .
Since these formulae are not easily interpretable, the reader can refer to
the associated working paper. However, Figure 3 below gives an illustration
of this type of relations when the number of sponsors and the number of
voters are large. We then give simpler formulae below, specically when the
electorate is innitely large and the number of sponsors is arbitrarily xed.
Proposition 6 Suppose that AP is the voting rule,  changes from 3 to 6
and n tends to innity, then
H(;1; 3) =
(
1803 6304+5765+7
56
 900+25202 34203+22504 5765+133
56
if 0    12
if 12   < 1
H(;1; 4) =
(
2303 8054+7365+8
63
 1150+32202 43703+28754 7365+169
63
if 0    12
if 12   < 1
H(;1; 5) =
(
4703 16454+15045+15
126
 2350+65802 89303+58754 15045+344
126
if 0    12
if 12   < 1
H(;1; 6) =
(
16903 59154+54085+50
462
( 8450+23 660
2
 32 1103+
21 1254 54085+1233 )
462
if 0    12
if 12   < 1
The expressions above can be plotted as follows in Figure 2:
Fig.2 Strategic sponsoring under amendment for a large electorate
The four curves reveal a strict symmetry with respect to line  = 12 ,
a local minimum. Moreover, the four frequency curves have the same two
local maxima, at  = 38 = 0:375 and at  =
5
8 = 0:625. In other words, this
means that strategic sponsoring is more likely to occur when the quota is
37:5% or 62:5%. We can also note that the frequencies rise between 3 and
4 sponsors and then decrease for 5 and 6 sponsors. At  = 38 or
5
8 ,
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 (sponsors) 3 4 5 6
H(;1; ) = 0:148 0:153 0:146 0:135
This means that strategic sponsoring is most likely to occur when the
number  of sponsors is xed to four.
Figure 3 illustrates the following facts: (i) frequencies decrease as the
number of sponsors rises; (ii) there is a strict symmetry with respect to line
 = 12 , for any number of sponsors; (iii) furthermore, the value  at the local
maxima remain constant whatever the number of voters and sponsors; this
can easily be checked by the reader, by taking the derivative with respect
to  and setting it equal to 0.
Fig.3 Strategic sponsoring under amendment for a large electorate
To summarize, we have shown that for amendment procedures, the fre-
quency of occurrence is maximal for 4 sponsors and for  equal to 58 or
3
8 . In the context of simple majority contests the frequencies of strategic
sponsoring get smaller and smaller as the number of sponsors grows.
4.2 Successive elimination rules with maximin voters
Let K(; n; ) be the likelihood that under successive elimination rules with
-majority contests and with maximin voters, a strategic sponsoring situ-
ation exists with n voters and  sponsors. As above, we rst consider the
case  = 12 .
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Proposition 7 Let SEm 1
2
be the voting rule and  a xed proportion k of
n. Then for n  2, K( 12 ; n; nk ) =8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
5kn(  96k
4
n
2
 804k4n 1368k4 462k3n3 3878k3n2 7276k3n 1920k3+187k2n4+
1628k2n3+3516k2n2+1440k2n+78kn5+662kn4+1324kn3+480kn2+5n6+40n5+60n4)
8(2k+n)(3k+n)(4k+n)(5k+n)(n+1)(n+3)(n+5)(k+n)
if n  0 mod 2
5k( 96k
4
n
2
 456k4n 408k4 462k3n3 2212k3n2 2526k3n+187k2n4+
1012k2n3+1161k2n2+78kn5+388kn4+414kn3+5n6+20n5+15n4 )
8(2k+n)(3k+n)(4k+n)(5k+n)(n+2)(n+4)(k+n)
if n  1 mod 2
For some special values of k, we have:
Corollary 3 Suppose SEm 1
2
is the voting rule. Then for n  2
K( 12 ; n;
n
5 ) =8>>><
>>>:
125n(n
6+86n5+1609n4 2086n3 
90 890n2 275 200n 219 000 )
8(n+1)(n+3)(n+5)2(n+10)(n+15)(n+20)(n+25)
125(n
6+82n5+1326n4 6076n3 
61 495n2 120 150n 51 000 )
8(n+2)(n+4)(n+5)(n+10)(n+15)(n+20)(n+25)
if n  0 mod 2
if n  1 mod 2
K( 12 ; n;
n
4 ) =8>>><
>>>:
5n(5n
6+352n5+5700n4+1776n3 
214 592n2 648 448n 473 088 )
2(n+1)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5)(n+8)(n+12)(n+16)(n+20)
5(5n
6+332n5+4559n4 11 720n3 
147 568n2 278 400n 104 448 )
2(n+2)(n+4)2(n+8)(n+12)(n+16)(n+20)
if n  0 mod 2
if n  1 mod 2
K( 12 ; n;
n
3 ) =8>><
>>:
15n(5n
6+274n5+3729n4+6150n3 
79 398n2 248 616n 162 648 )
8(n+1)(n+3)2(n+5)(n+6)(n+9)(n+12)(n+15)
15(5n5+239n4+2145n3 8559n2 31 374n 11 016)
8(n+2)(n+4)(n+6)(n+9)(n+12)(n+15)
if n  0 mod 2
if n  1 mod 2
K( 12 ; n;
n
2 ) =8>><
>>:
5n(5n
6+196n5+2132n4+5464n3 
17 536n2 65 312n 37 248 )
4(n+1)(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5)(n+6)(n+8)(n+10)
5(5n5+166n4+1207n3 1234n2 12 120n 3264)
(4n+8)(n+4)2(n+6)(n+8)(n+10)
if n  0 mod 2
if n  1 mod 2
K( 12 ; n; n) =8>><
>>:
5n(5n6+118n5+909n4+2490n3+22n2 6640n 3288)
8(n+1)2(n+2)(n+3)2(n+4)(n+5)2
5(5n6+98n5+590n4+964n3 1147n2 2982n 408)
8(n+1)(n+2)2(n+3)(n+4)2(n+5)
if n  0 mod 2
if n  1 mod 2
Graphically we have in Figure 4:
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Fig. 4 Strategic sponsoring under maximin with
n
k
sponsors
As for the amendment rules, Figure 4 shows that strategic sponsoring is
generally less likely to occur when the number of sponsors is weak relatively
to the number of voters. For the french parliament (n = 577), the frequencies
are 0:016 for k = 3 and 0:027 for k = 5 (see the appendix for a table of
values).
We next come to the general formulae, with  = 12 .
Proposition 8 Let SEm 1
2
be the voting rule. Then for n  2, K( 12 ; n; ) =8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
5(5n
3

4+78n33+187n32 462n3 96n3+40n24+662n23+1628n22 3878n2 
804n2+60n4+1324n3+3516n2 7276n 1368n+4803+14402 1920 )
8(+1)(+2)(+3)(+4)(+5)(n+1)(n+3)(n+5)(+4)(+5)(n+1)(n+3)(n+5)
if n  0 mod 2
5(5n
2

4+78n23+187n22 462n2 96n2+20n4+388n3+
1012n2 2212n 456n+154+4143+11612 2526 408 )
8(+1)(+2)(+3)(+4)(+5)(n+2)(n+4)
if n  1 mod 2
Corollary 4 In a large society,
K( 12 ;1; ) =
5(54+783+1872 462 96)
8(+1)(+2)(+3)(+4)(+5)
For some special values of , we have:
 (sponsors) 3 4 5 6
K( 12 ;1; ) 0:252 0:303 0:313 0:307
Again, as for the amendment rule, K( 12 ; n; ) tends to 0 when  tends
to innity. However, it is worth noting that for maximin the maximal oc-
currence when n tends to innity is for ve sponsors (this number was four
for the amendment rules).
As for the amendment rules, we give formulae when n tends to innity
with some special values of  and present the associated plots (Figure 5
and Figure 6). Formulae for the general case can be found in the associated
working paper.
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Proposition 9 Suppose that SEm is the voting rule. Then
K(;1; 3) =
(
1802 4203+1804+1085+7
56
 360+12602 21003+16204 4685+55
56
if 0    12
if 12   < 1
K(;1; 4) =
(
5902 15203+10654 625+16
126
 570+23902 44803+37054 11185+89
126
if 0    12
if 12   < 1
K(;1; 5) =
(
6702 17903+14104 2385+15
126
 420+20502 41503+35704 11025+67
126
if 0    12
if 12   < 1
K(;1; 6) =
(
12802 34903+29054 6245+25
231
 590+32802 70103+61854 19365+96
231
if 0    12
if 12   < 1
Fig. 5 Strategic sponsoring under maximin for a large electorate
Figure 5 shows that all the curves have their local maxima around  =p
2   1. However when the number of sponsors rises, the maxima move
towards the ordinates axis.
For example for  = 4, the maximum is obtain at  = 0:414, and at
 = 0:412 for  = 6. Further, frequencies are highest for 5 sponsors, and
the maximum (32:8 15 %) is reached at  = 0:413. We can also analyze the
evolution of the frequencies when the number of sponsors rises, by studying
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the three-dimensional plot.
Fig. 6 Strategic sponsoring under maximin for a large electorate
Again, it appears that, as the number of sponsors rises, (i) the trend of
frequencies is decreasing and (ii) the local maxima correspond to values of
 closer to 0.
Then under successive elimination rules with maximin behavior, strate-
gic sponsoring occurrence is maximal for  = 5 at  around
p
2   1 and
decreases with simple majority contests as  gets larger.
4.3 Successive elimination rules with maximax voters
Let J(; n; ) be the likelihood of strategic sponsoring situations under suc-
cessive elimination rules with -majority contests and with maximax voters
a exists. Again, we rst consider the  = 12 case.
Proposition 10 Let SEM 1
2
be the voting rule. Then for n  2, J( 12 ; n; k) =8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
5kn(  72k
4
n
2
 288k4n 96k4 454k3n3 2856k3n2 5352k3n 3840k3+261k2n4+
2004k2n3+4508k2n2+2880k2n+94kn5+696kn4+1512kn3+960kn2+3n6+12n5+4n4)
16(2k+n)(3k+n)(4k+n)(5k+n)(n+1)(n+3)(n+5)(k+n)
if n  0 mod 2
5k( 72k
4
n
2
 192k4n+264k4 454k3n3 1904k3n2 1482k3n+261k2n4+
1336k2n3+1283k2n2+94kn5+464kn4+402kn3+3n6+8n5 11n4 )
16(2k+n)(3k+n)(4k+n)(5k+n)(n+2)(n+4)(k+n)
if n  1 mod 2
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For some special values of k, we have:
Corollary 5 Suppose that SEM 1
2
. Then for n  2
J( 12 ; n;
n
5 ) =8>>><
>>>:
25n(3n
6+482n5+10 009n4+910n3 
284 500n2 777 000n 540 000 )
16(n+1)(n+3)(n+5)2(n+10)(n+15)(n+20)(n+25)
25(3n
6+478n5+8834n4 21 340n3 
250 925n2 305 250n+165 000 )
16(n+2)(n+4)(n+5)(n+10)(n+15)(n+20)(n+25)
if n  0 mod 2
if n  1 mod 2
J( 12 ; n;
n
4 ) =8>>><
>>>:
5n(3n
6+388n5+6964n4+9056n3 
125 248n2 370 176n 270 336 )
4(n+1)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5)(n+8)(n+12)(n+16)(n+20)
15(n
6+128n5+2007n4 2024n3 
39 920n2 48 000n+22 528 )
4(n+2)(n+4)2(n+8)(n+12)(n+16)(n+20)
if n  0 mod 2
if n  1 mod 2
J( 12 ; n;
n
3 ) =8>>><
>>>:
15n(3n
6+294n5+4441n4+10 314n3 
39 492n2 141 912n 111 456 )
16(n+1)(n+3)2(n+5)(n+6)(n+9)(n+12)(n+15)
15(3n
6+290n5+3730n4+972n3 
45 693n2 55 566n+21 384 )
16(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+6)(n+9)(n+12)(n+15)
if n  0 mod 2
if n  1 mod 2
J( 12 ; n;
n
2 ) =8>><
>>:
5n(3n6+200n5+2440n4+7408n3 4048n2 35 904n 32 256)
8(n+1)(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5)(n+6)(n+8)(n+10)
5(3n6+196n5+1961n4+2516n3 11 252n2 14 928n+4224)
8(n+2)2(n+4)2(n+6)(n+8)(n+10)
if n  0 mod 2
if n  1 mod 2
J( 12 ; n; n) =8>><
>>:
5n(3n6+106n5+961n4+3062n3+2540n2 2760n 3936)
16(n+1)2(n+2)(n+3)2(n+4)(n+5)2
15(n 1)(n5+35n4+273n3+701n2+470n 88)
16(n+1)(n+2)2(n+3)(n+4)2(n+5)
if n  0 mod 2
if n  1 mod 2
We then plot the above frequencies in Figure 7:
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Fig. 7 Strategic sponsoring under maximax with
n
k
sponsors
And as for the two previous procedures, the frequency of coalitional
strategic sponsoring, for a given value of n, is generally greater when the
number of sponsors is small as compared with the number of voters. For the
french parliament(n = 577), the frequencies are 0:009 for k = 5 and 0:002
for k = 1 (see the appendix for a table of values).
We now examine the general case for simple majority.
Proposition 11 Suppose that SEM 1
2
is the voting rule. Then for n  2
and   3, J( 12 ; n; ) =8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
5( 3n
3

4+94n33+261n32 454n3 72n3+12n24+696n23+2004n22 
2856n2 288n2+4n4+1512n3+4508n2 5352n 96n+9603+28802 3840)
16(+1)(+2)(+3)(+4)(+5)(n+1)(n+3)(n+5)
if n  0 mod 2
5(3n
2

4+94n23+261n22 454n2 72n2+8n4+464n3+
1336n2 1904n 192n 114+4023+12832 1482+264)
16(+1)(+2)(+3)(+4)(+5)(n+2)(n+4)
if n  1 mod 2
Corollary 6 In a large society,
J( 12 ;1; ) =
5(34+943+2612 454 72)
16(+1)(+2)(+3)(+4)(+5)
For special values of , we have:
 (sponsors) 3 4 5 6
J( 12 ;1; ) 0:172 0:188 0:184 0:174
Once again, the likelihood of strategic sponsoring is maximal for 4 spon-
sors. Note that J( 12 ; n; ) also tends to 0 as  tends to innity.
As for the two previous procedures general formulae are given in the
associated working paper.
And for some arbitrary values of  when n tends to innity, we obtain:
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Proposition 12 Suppose that SEM is the voting rule. Then
J(;1; 3) =
(
1803 5704+5045+7
56
 780+20402 24603+13504 2645+121
56
if 0    12
if 12   < 1
J(;1; 4) =
8<
:
2(1153 3554+3115+4)
63
2( 480+12302 14253+7254 1215+75)
63
if 0    12
if 12   < 1
J(;1; 5) =
(
4703 14354+12525+15
126
 1930+49002 55703+27254 4125+302
126
if 0    12
if 12   < 1
J(;1; 6) =
(
8453 25654+22335+25
231
 3440+86902 97753+46754 6635+538
231
if 0    12
if 12   < 1
And graphically in Figure 8 and Figure 9:
Fig. 8 Strategic sponsoring under maximax for a large electorate
The four frequency curves reveal a local maximum at around  = 0:66.
But contrary to the maximin case, the maxima move at the further from the
ordinates axis as the number of sponsors rises. For example for  = 3 and
 = 5, the maximum is obtain at  = 0:661 and at  = 0:665, respectively.
Moreover the frequency is highest for  = 4, and for  = 0:664, strategic
sponsoring frequencies grow up to 21:3 35 %.
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Fig. 9 Strategic sponsoring under maximax for a large electorate
A close look at Figure 9 conrms that for small values of , there is a
local maximum around  = 0:66. But as the number of sponsors gets larger,
there is a shift of this maximum towards values of  that are closer to 1.
Then under successive elimination rules with maximax, strategic spon-
soring occurrence is maximal when  = 4, at  around 0:66 and with  = 12 ,
the smaller the number of sponsors as compared with the number of voters,
the higher the frequencies.
5 Concluding discussion
The goal of this paper was to compare three families of parliamentary rules
through the study of their vulnerability to strategic sponsoring. In order to
do that, we were concerned with computing the frequency of voting situa-
tions at which parliamentary rules with  majority contests are vulnerable
to coalitional strategic sponsoring of alternatives. Our results show how
these frequencies change according to changes in the values of the number
of voters, the number of sponsors and the qualied majority. Further, it
appears that for all three families of rules: (i) frequencies tend to 0 as the
number of sponsors rises, ceteris paribus, that is with a xed number of
voters and given any value of ; (ii) however, notice that in actual situa-
tions - as emphasized by Dutta and Pattanaik (1978, p. 169) - the number
of sponsors is generally very small as compared with the number of voters,
and then frequencies are higher.
It also appears that for every possible qualied majority , and given the
number of sponsors and the number of voters, frequencies are always higher
with the two versions of successive elimination than with amendment. Now,
comparing successive elimination with either maximin or maximax does
not lead to a clear conclusion of this kind. However, we observe that for
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small values of , frequencies are higher for maximin than for maximax, as
illustrated with four sponsors in Figure 10 (see the appendix).
Besides, note that some other results can be derived from the character-
izations. We observe that for none of the voting rules under study does the
set of strategic sponsoring opportunities coincide with the set of Condorcet
cycles. However, for amendment rule, strategic sponsoring Types 3 and 4
requires the presence of a Condorcet cycle, while there is no such relation
for the other two rules. In the same way, it can also easily be checked that
with single-peaked individual preferences (voters and sponsors), strategic
sponsoring occurs under the three procedures.
Finally, it is worth noting that these procedures have been studied in
the literature in the context of strategic voting (see Favardin and Lepelley
2006; or Mbih, Moyouwou and Zhao 2006) and it may be interesting to
consider some slightly di¤erent context by specically assuming that spon-
sors participate to the nal vote, and examining the possibility of combined
strategic sponsoring and strategic voting.
Appendix
In this appendix, we give a gure comparing the three rules for large elec-
torates and we also gives tables summarizing the results given in Section
4.
Fig. 10 Strategic sponsoring under the three rules
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Table 1 Strategic sponsoring with n
k
sponsors with alpha = 1=2
Amendment Successive with maximin Successive with maximax
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